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Abstract. The security of communication in everyday life becomes very 
important. On the other hand, all existing encryption protocols require from 
user additional knowledge end resources. In this paper we discuss the problem 
of public key distribution between interested parties. We propose to use a 
popular social media as a channel to publish public keys. This way of key 
distribution allows also easily connect owner of the key with real person 
institution (what is not always easy). Recognizing that the mobile devices 
become the main tool of communication, we present description of mobile 
application that uses proposed security methods. 
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1 Introduction 
 
In nowadays people take into account security of information exchange. There are 
many different methods of encryption. The most spread and probably most popular 
are asymmetric methods based on a pair of users keys, public and private. While 
private key has to be kept very secret the public should be freely distributed between 
all interested parties and here we arrive at the big gap in used protocols. All known 
methodologies are very interested in securing the keys and authorization. We can sign 
the public key via well-known institutions (VeriSign, Comodo SSL, GlobalSign, etc.) 
and prove that a defined person or a company created this key. Even having a given 
key of a John Smith from Milwaukee how can a person be sure that this is exactly the 
same John Smith he knows? For many persons (even institutions) knowing their 
names and addresses is not enough. On the other hand if the John Smith is 
somebody’s friend in real life he can be a “friend” in virtual one. They usually are 
connected via social network (facebook, linkedIn, etc.). The life would be much 
simpler if we could obtain his public key from this social network. In this paper we 
introduce an architecture for applications that allows sending encrypted information 
between two mobile devices using public key infrastructure and social media with 
QRcodes as a method of seamless distribution of public key.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we analyze the possibility of the 
storage of the public key with use of social media. The next Section contains 
requirements for QRcodes. Section 4 focuses on the used encryption method. Section 
5 contains description of the proposed application architecture. At the end we present 
our final remarks and conclusions. 
2 Public key distribution using social media 
There are many interesting methods of public key distribution. One of the well-known 
methods of public key distribution is usage of key servers. Conventional PKI and 
PGP are still hard to be used by average users [1, 2]. The task to acquire valid public 
key of a friend is not an easy one. Nowadays users are used to use the social networks 
as the environment for searching any personal information. The everyday social 
networks and mobile devices revolutionized ways of communication. The average 
user is used to integrate all mobile devices with some social medias and requires all 
important data to be synchronized with the device phone book. Unfortunately existing 
key servers are not ready to be used in such a way. Some important elements have to 
be taken into account during the process of public key distribution: 
a) ownership of the stored public key, 
b) correspondence between the owner and real party (person, company, foundation, 
etc.), 
c) easy accessibility to all interested parties, 
d) is the key still actual/valid or was revoked. 
Even though we have the key from some public storage in order use it we have to 
be sure to whom it belongs. The name of the person or company and even address are 
not always enough. Analyzing presented requirements we can notice that usual PKI or 
PGP key distribution does not always fulfill point b and d. We can try to use the 
webpage of a party or company, but there are often some additional problems: 
 what the page address is, 
 where the key is stored, 
 how to obtain the key automatically.  
On the other hand, nowadays the social media are the most spread and used mean 
of information distribution. Based on that experience there is an idea of using that 
medium for key distribution. First we have to analyze what kinds of information are 
already used in social medias. We can easily stress that on most of social portals users 
can store some data. The security measures used in such medias restrict that only the 
owner of the account can store and change this information. We can identify two 
types of information: 
1. persistent data - like photos (usually more than one), web page address, email 
address,  
2. transient data - like status, notes and memos.  
The first type of information is usually stored in the users profile while the latter in 
some blog type medium. It is obvious that transient data is not a good candidate for 
our purpose. This means we should concentrate on elements that can be stored in 
users’ profile. Moreover, it has to be noted that usually user is not allowed to 
customize what kind of information can be stored there. 
It was already proposed by [3] to store link to our public key as one of user’s web 
addresses. This is interesting idea however the user still has to have some special 
place for storing the key and social medium is used only as the information where to 
find the public key. Moreover, this method is easy accessible by machines while 
strange web addresses are not well perceived by humans. 
The second very interesting place for the key is user profile photo/image or gallery 
(if exists). This will give us huge area for implementations if we would be able to 
store the public key inside the photo gallery. Now, we will try to cover this case more 
carefully. We have to take into account that social media usually optimize images that 
often means resizing, increasing jpg compressions.   
2.1 Storing public key in photo metadata 
Almost all image formats allow storing some additional information in attached 
metadata (Exif [4], XMP [5], IPTC [6]). That would be a good place to store the 
public key inside the metadata of profile picture. Unfortunately, the most known 
social portals (facebook, linkedIn) erase all metadata after the upload. This means that 
if we upload a photo with some information added in its metadata the information 
would be lost and not available for others. 
2.2 Storing public key in photo file 
There are many methods of steganography [7-8] that allow storing some information 
inside images. Unfortunately, these methods are very sensitive on operations like 
resizing and jpg optimization. All images uploaded to social medias are optimized and 
this operation would make impossible usage of steganography. Even hiding public 
key after the file closing marker would not work because all the information after the 
EOF (End Of File) marker is deleted by social media portal. 
2.3 Storing public key inside as a QRcode 
QRcode [9-10] is an image that encodes some text. It is possible to store public key as 
QRcode. The idea of using QRcode as key exchange for secure mobile 
communication was presented in our previous paper [11]. That way of storing the key 
has some advantages:   
1. QRcode does not lose information during usual image resizing, 
2. QRcode does not lose information during changes of format {.jpg, .png, .gif …}.  
Storing public key as QRcode inside user gallery agrees with all requirements. We 
should decide for some nomenclature of naming the file with public key QRcode. 
Unfortunately, we cannot store it as profile picture, most of the people prefer to use 
real photo in that place. On the other hand, QRcodes nowadays are so widespread that 
they should not be perceived as out of place in user’s photo gallery.  
2.4 Storing QRcode on a given picture 
There are some possibilities to store QRcode and a given picture together. There are 
methods like colored QRcodes but they are not acceptable for profile picture. There 
are also approaches to include a QRcode inside a picture. This is however not possible 
for all images and small QRcodes can be lost during resizing and optimization 
procedures. It is possible that some encoding of QRcode in image using HSB color 
space would be resistant for resizing and optimization but the impact of such 
procedure on image itself has to be determined. 
2.5 Conclusions 
According to presented analyze the best choice is to store public key in form of 
QRcode inside user’s profile on social portal. This solves easily the problem of 
propagation and accessibility, on the other hand keeping some information about 
authenticity – only user can store photos in his/her gallery and prevents phishing 
attacks [12-13]. The problem of revoking the old key is easy to organize in proposed 
manner also. Moreover if somebody would like to narrow group of users that can 
view/use public key then access to galleries can be restricted to selected group of 
users (friends), this is possible in most of social portals. 
3 Selection of QR code parameters 
On the basis of [9-11] it was found that the best type of QR code to use for our 
purposes will be the version 17 (85x85). It will allow hiding a public key with the 
length of 2048 bits with the highest possible error correction feature – level H, 
approx. 30%. In the Table 1 shown below there is short description of QRcodes 
capacity using different variants of QRcodes. 
Table 1. QR code types and their capacity 
Parameters 
QR code type 
QR code 
Model 1 
QR code 
Model 2 
Micro 
QR code 
iQR 
code 
Max Size 
[modules] 
73x73 177x177 17x17 422x422 
Max Capacity 
 in numerals 
1101 7089 35 40637 
Max Capacity 
in alphanumeric 
667 4296 21 ~24626 
Max Capacity  
in binary [bytes] 
458 2953 15 ~16928 
4 Encryption variants 
Depending on the amount of data to be transferred between users, we can distinguish 
two possible encryption schemes [14, 15] which have application in mobile 
implementation described in the next section: 
A. asymmetric cryptography, 
B. asymmetric cryptography together with symmetric. 
 
Fig.1. Asymmetric cryptography - ensuring data integrity and confidentiality   
 
Because the asymmetric cryptography is slower than the symmetric one, first 
variant should only be applied to transmit short information, such as chat or SMS. If 
the user wants to send information, he encrypts it by the receiver's public key, which 
he has collected earlier from the social networking site. The receiver decrypts the 
message with its private key known only to him. Similarly, this is done the other way 
(Fig. 1). 
One of the problems is that this scheme above does not provide 
authentication/identification of the information about the sending user. To ensure the 
authentication of the sender, the sender should first encrypt the message with its 
private key, and after that encrypt it again by the public key of the receiver. This 
allows the receiver be sure who is sending a message to him, because he will have to 
download the sender's public key from the social networking site in order to decrypt 
the information (Fig. 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Asymmetric cryptography - ensuring data integrity, confidentiality and sender 
authentication 
 
In the case of the second encryption variant, the use of asymmetric cryptography 
with symmetric would allow to encrypt long information, i.e. files or stream call. In 
this variant, the transmission will be encrypted using symmetric cryptography. 
Exchange of components, which are important to establish a common one-time 
session key, will be done using asymmetric cryptography [16]. To establish a one-
time session key, each party must first randomly generate 128 or 256-bit secret key. 
Secret key length depends on the used session encryption algorithm (AES-128 or 
AES-256). Then, the keys must be exchanged between parties using asymmetric 
cryptography (analogous manner as shown in Figure 1). At this point, each party has 
two secret keys. To establish a common one time session key each of the sides uses 
XOR operation on these two secret keys (Fig. 3). 
.  
Fig. 3. The process of session key establishing 
 The secure information exchange process is shown in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Secure information exchange process 
The proposed solution of session key establishment is different from standard 
methods like Diffie-Hellman algorithm. This means that no clear text information 
related to the key will not be possible to eavesdrop [17, 18]. The attacker will be able 
to capture only the data already encrypted with which he will not be able to do 
anything. 
We should analyze the impact on the presented method when somebody breaks 
into user’s social portal account (assume it is Bob’s account). Even though such 
possibility exists the evil party could only change the user’s public key into fake one. 
Such action would make impossible to continue encrypted communication between 
Alice and Bob because Bob’s original private and fake public keys would not be 
paired anymore. Moreover, the intruder would not be able to decrypt messages sent 
by Alice until the Bob’s private key is compromised. In the result Bob would be 
informed that his social account was broken. He would probably upload original 
public key once again and increase security measures of his social account. This 
implies that the main security precautions have to be taken when implementing 
proposed method. This will be important to keep private key secure in mobile device 
application. 
5 Mobile implementation 
5.1 Mobile communication 
Usually encrypted communication begins with keys exchange. In proposed method of 
asymmetric cryptography suites perfectly for short messages and does not need any 
key exchange protocols at all. Interested parties can obtain appropriate receiver key 
from social network and stores own private one. Therefore, it can be easily deployed 
for smartphones to encrypt SMS communication. The latter of proposed methods 
need an exchange of a session encryption key and can be used on smartphones, tablets 
or even laptops (devices which have screen and camera) for stream communications. 
5.2 Mobile application requirements  
 
In order to implement mobile application that uses the presented encryption methods 
with usage of social network as public key store we define the application 
prerequisites: 
 the Internet access, 
 Social Medias Network access, can upload and download files/images from 
them, 
 save data (keys), 
 can generate Qrcode, 
 process Qrcodes, 
 can capture and send SMS, or capture voice telephony agent to work with 
the stream voice transmission,  
 can encrypt and decrypt using presented methods. 
The prerequisites of the application can be widened or shortened due to the 
application’s functionality. The idea of application that uses text SMS can be shown 
on simple diagram (Fig. 5). The idea of the method and its mobile applications is 
presented in the paper [19]. 
 Fig. 5. SMS encrypting application that uses proposed cryptographic method 
 
6 Conclusions 
In nowadays there is need for secure data exchange and the mobile devices are the 
most spread tools used for communication. On the other hand most of users does not 
have enough skills to use sophisticated encryption methods and key exchange 
protocols. The need for secure communication and the ease of usage are very 
welcome by the community. The proposal of secure data exchange with everyday 
social network as key store solves both of the problems. On the other hand usage of 
images from social network gallery makes it easy to accept by ordinary mobile user. 
The proposed method can be implemented on mobile smartphones and description of 
such application was presented. The application will be presented in more detailed 
manner in next articles.  
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